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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
THE KANSAS "MANHATTAN COCKTAIL CASE" AND SOME OTHERS CON-
CERNING JUDICIAL NoricE.-Some anti-prohibitionists may think they have an
"eye-opener" in the recent Kansas decision that judicial notice will be taken
of the intoxicating properties of a Manhattan cocktail: State v. Pigg, 97
Pac. 859.
Pigg complains to the supreme court that he was charged with an "unlaw-
ful sale of intoxicating liquor" and that'on one count the state elceted to
rely upon a sale of two M1anhattan cocktails; that he was convicted, although
there was no evidence that a Manhattan cocktail is intoxicating. On this
point the court says: "The Century Dictionary defines a cocktail as 'An
American drink, strong, stimulating, and cold, made of spirits, bitters, and a
little sugar, with various aromatic and stimulating additions.' The particular
kind of cocktail under discussion is popularly understood to have taken its
name from the island whose inhabitants first became addicted to its 'use.
While its characteristics are not so widely known as those of whisky, brandy,
or gin, it is our understanding that a Manhattan cocktail is generally and
popularly known to be intoxicating." The judgment of conviction is affirmed
by a full court.
Local circumstances and the customs of the time have much to do with
the determination of the question as to what matters courts will judicially
notice, and it may be suggested that a judge should not close-say, his eyes
-to those sources of information that are open to all about him. However,
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NOTE AND COMMENT
it is to be remembered that "there is a real but elusive line between the
judge's personal knowledge as a private man and his knowledge as a
judge. The latter does not necessarily include the former; as a judge,
indeed, he may have to ignore what he knows as a man, and contrariwise."
(WIGMORE, EVIDENcz, § 2569.) But whether he should or should not ignore
as a judge what he knows as a man, it does not necessarily follow from this
decision that "prohibition does not prohibit," because, while it is generally
admitted that judges are underpaid and so presumably have little money
to spend on vacation travels, they have been known to travel, and it is quite
possible that a western judge may have visited the eastern island metropolis
and there learned to distinguish "sky-scrapers" from corncribs and "'oyster
cocktails" from "Manhattan cocktails."
As an illustration of the principle that usages of time and place control
decisions on this subject, it may be noted that territorial expansion has
enlarged the list of judicially noticed intoxicants, and it now embraces
liquors until recently unknown to the American bar: "Okolehoa," the
Hawaiian beverage, will be noticed judicially as an intoxicating liquor (Tize
Kawailani, 128 Fed. 879) ; and so, undoubtedly, would be the "tuba" of the
Philippine islands (see United States v. Dalasa3, 5 Philip. Rep. 41).
Some liquors, such as whisky, gin, rum and brandy, have been noticed
universally by the courts as intoxicating, but as to some others-for example,
"leer"--there has been a difference of opinion. It is not clear whether or
not climatic conditions, as well as local usages, have a bearing on the ques-
tion as perhaps affecting the quantity of liquor that reasonably may be con-
sumed as a beverage without producing intoxication. In Texas, for example,
"beer" is not necessarily intoxicating, and the court is not prepared to hold
even that "lager beer" is judicially known to be so (Potts v. State, 5o Tex.
Cr. App. 368, 97 S. W. 477), while in Wisconsin the contrary is held, the
court there remarking that "when beer is called for at the bar, in a saloon
or hotel, the bartender would know at once from the common use of the
word that a strong beer-a spirituousl or intoxicating beer-was wanted"
(Briflit v. State, 58 Wis. 39, 46 Am. R. 621), but just how the court obtained
this assurance is not stated. To the argument that the word "beer" does
not imply an intoxicating liquor because there are -many kinds of beer some
of which are not intoxicating, the court replies that when one is asked to
take a drink of milk it would be unnecessary to prove what is meant, though
there are many kinds of milk: "such as 'the white juice of plants,' which
is the remote definition; or milk in the cocoanut, or that in the milky-way."
This lofty flight of the judicial imagination, taken in 1883, is prophetically
suggestive of pleasant journeys to Mars, and of slaking one's thirst from a
bucket dipped over the side of his aroplane as it churns through the milky-
way.
While there may be some question as to whether the simple term "beer,"
unaccompanied by evidence as to its quality, should be taken as necessarily
meaning an intoxicating liquor (see Blatz v. Rohrback, ii6 N. Y. 450,
6 L. R. A. 669; State v. Siou.x Falls Brewing Co., 5 S. D. 39, 26 L. R. A. 138;
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Gripe v. State (Ga. Crt. Ap. i9o8), 62 S. E. 567; Dallas Brewery v. Holmes
Bros., Tex. Civ. Ap. 19o8, 112 S. W. 122), in most of the recent decisions
it is, nevertheless, judicially noticed as intoxicating (Feddern v. State [Neb.
1907], 113 N. W. 127; State v. Seelig, I6 N. D. 177, 112 N. W. i4o; State v.
Moran, 46 Wash. 596, go Pac. io44; State v. Carmody, Ore. i9o7, 9I Pac. 446,
12 L. R. A. [N. S.] 828; Hall v. The People, 134 Ill. App. 559); and even
if "beer" is not so judicially noticed, "lager beer" is (State v. Church,
6 S. D. 89-a case name, by the way, hardly suggesting such a matter-;
Cripe v. State, - Crt. Ap. Ga. i9o8 -, 62 S. E. 567).
Obviously, what is legally intoxicating liquor-if one may so speak-
cannot be made otherwise by evasively calling it by some name not indicative
of its true character. If the case at the bar is a case of intoxicants it
cannot be made a case of non-intoxicants by such labels as: "Frosty," "Ino,"
"Uno" (Potts v. State, 97 S. W. 477; James v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. App.
334, 91 S. W. 227); "Hop Pop" (People v. Rice, 1o3 Mich. 350); "Hop
Jack" (Lambie v. State, 151 Ala. 86, 44 So. 51); "Hop Soda" (Peddern v.
State, Neb. 1907, 113 N. W. 127); "Pop" (Godfreidson v. People, 88 Ill.
284; "Gold Foam" (State v. Ely, S. D. igo8, II8 N. W. 687); "Grape Juice"
(Askew v. State, Ga. i9o8, 61 S. E. 737); "Tanto" (State v. Olson, 95
Minn. 104).
Where such evasion is attempted the courts very judiciously leave the
question to the jurors rather than undertake to decide it themselves; so
whether, for instance, "Sherman's Prickly Ash Bitters" or "McLean's
Strengthening Cordial and Blood Purifier" are included within a statute
defining intoxicating liquors as "all liquors and mixtures by 'whatever name
called, that will produce intoxication," is a question for the jury (Intoxi-
cating Liquors Cases, 25 Kan. 751) ; and in deciding this question the jury
may take exhibits with them on retiring to look at, but not to taste (State
v. Olson, 95 Minn. 1o4).
The title "Intoxicating Liquors" has become an important one in the
law. Each step in the regulation of the liquor traffic has been tested in the
courts by those specially interested in it. In discussing the liquor question
much has been said by those opposed to the trade about the waste and
expense caused by it, but has anyone ever attempted to compute the amount
of time and money that have been spent in simply defining "intoxicating
liquor?" J.H.B.
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